

## BILLION DOLLAR BOONDOGGLE ACT

The Billion Dollar Boondoggle Act requires an annual report to taxpayers listing every government-funded project that is \$1 billion or more over budget or five years or more behind schedule.

For each project, the report would provide:

- (1) a brief description, including the purpose, location, the year in which it was begun, the Federal share of the total cost, and the contractors and grant recipients;
- (2) an explanation of any change to the original scope of the project, including adding to or narrowing of the initial requirements;
- (3) the original expected completion date;
- (4) the current expected completion date;
- (5) the original cost estimate;
- (6) the current cost estimate;
- (7) an explanation for a delay in completion or increase in the original cost estimate; and
- (8) the amount of and rationale for any award, incentive fee, or other type of bonus, if any, awarded for the project.

Cost overruns and schedule delays may be the result of poor calculations or unique challenges to produce something that has not been made before, such as a new rocket or defense system. They may also be signs of far deeper issues, such as mismanagement or fraud.

This bill creates an automatic alert system for Congress to get to the bottom of a problem before it becomes a bottomless money pit for taxpayer dollars.

After being alerted to a number of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) construction projects with ballooning budgets and missed deadlines by the Government Accountability Office (GAO),<sup>1</sup> for example, Congress passed laws to address the problems. The Rocky Mountain Regional VA Medical Center finally opened last year, five years behind schedule and \$1 billion over budget. It is the most expensive medical center ever constructed by the VA, yet has fewer primary care exam rooms and the same number of rooms as a nearby VA center that is half of its size. As a result of the management blunders identified by GAO, however, Congress put the Army Corps of Engineers in charge of completing the project and stripped the VA of the authority over similar big projects in the future.<sup>2</sup>

Identifying projects that are significantly over budget or behind schedule allows Congress and federal agencies to better manage taxpayer dollars and prevent bigger boondoggles.

Not every project that misses a deadline or costs more than anticipated is a boondoggle. Those symptoms, however, can be warning signs of larger troubles, such as questionable expenditures, mismanagement, incompetency, and even corruption.

Boondoggles are often bedeviled with avoidable complications or even brazen abuses. These may include workers paid to do nothing, bogus bonuses awarded for shoddy work, political payoffs and contractor

kickbacks exchanged for preferential treatment, or retaliation taken against whistleblowers for attempting to bring problems to light.

The completion of a high-speed train that was supposed to connect San Francisco and Los Angeles, for example, is 13 years behind schedule and \$44 billion over its original price tag. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been misspent and “flawed decision making” and “poor contract management” contributed “to billions of dollars in cost overruns and delays in the system’s construction,” according to the California state auditor.<sup>3</sup> While the governor has said he will push for more federal funding, the U.S. Department of Transportation is threatening to derail the train because California has violated terms of the agreement—including falling \$100 million short in the amount the state was expected to contribute to the project. Unless brought to a squealing halt now, this financial train wreck will be taking taxpayers for a ride without ever leaving the station.

Not every boondoggle can be solved by simply canceling a project, since some may be necessary or unavoidable.

The U.S. Census, for example, is constitutionally mandated to occur every decade. The 2020 national population count, already \$3 billion over budget, will be the most expensive in U.S. history. While it is the job of the Census Bureau to count accurately, its numbers do not add up. Government auditors warn the current cost estimate is not a reliable and is likely to grow unless action is taken. The Census Bureau, however, has largely ignored most of the 30 recommendations to conduct “a more cost-effective census” issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) years ago.<sup>4</sup>

The cleanup of radioactive waste remaining from weapons development is necessary for protecting the health of Americans and our environment. A decades-old cleanup at the Hanford site in Washington state has become a financial and management mess. The project is 25 years behind schedule and may end up costing \$100 billion more than originally estimated and has yet to treat any waste. The effort has been long plagued with mismanagement and fraud. The design of the treatment facility is being made up as it is being constructed. The remedy chosen to immobilize the waste is twice as costly as an alternative method being used elsewhere. Federal funds were illegally spent to lobby Congress to increase funding for the project. Employees were paid for hours not worked for almost a decade. A kickback scheme inflated payments to a contractor. Whistleblowers suffered retaliation for raising safety concerns. A contractor was awarded a \$15 million bonus despite delivering a defective container intended to hold radioactive waste that could have threatened the safety of workers and the health of nearby residents. The longer it takes to complete the cleanup, which has not even begun, the greater risk posed by the radioactive waste which is contained in aging containers, some of which have begun to leak.

While these projects may be essential, many budget-busting boondoggles are not, and others may be serving important functions but could be streamlined without compromising their mission. This bill could save billions of dollars by ensuring these projects are brought to the attention of taxpayers and lawmakers before becoming unsalvageable boondoggles.

To avoid being put on the list, federal agencies would have to do a better job managing the completion or estimating the true cost and duration of projects. Taxpayers will benefit from both outcomes.

## **High-Speed Train On Fast Track To Nowhere**

**Project:** A 520-mile high-speed “bullet” train rail line connecting San Francisco and Los Angeles is 13 years behind schedule and \$44 billion over its original price tag.<sup>5</sup>

**Location:** California

**Recipient:** California State Transportation Agency’s High-Speed Rail Authority

**Original Cost Estimate:** \$33.6 billion in 2008<sup>6</sup>

**Current Cost Estimate:** \$77.3 billion<sup>7</sup>

**Project Began:** Construction began in October 2013<sup>8</sup>

**Original Completion Date:** 2020<sup>9</sup>

**Current Completion Date:** 2033<sup>10</sup>

**Funding Source:** U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration

**Federal Spending:** \$3.5 billion to date.

The project received an initial \$2.6 billion grant in 2010 through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and another \$929 million in 2011.<sup>11</sup> Of these amounts, \$3.3 billion is for capital construction funds and \$231 million is for environmental review and preliminary engineering work.<sup>12</sup> The authority is pursuing additional federal assistance, including grants and loans.<sup>13</sup> Over \$38 billion in federal funds will be needed to complete Phase 1 of the project, according to the authority’s finance plan.<sup>14</sup>

**Problems:** The State Auditor released a scathing report in November 2018 concluding that the California High-Speed Rail Authority “cannot demonstrate that the hundreds of millions of dollars it has spent to date on the contracts we reviewed has been necessary or appropriate.”<sup>15</sup> Additionally, “flawed decision making” and “poor contract management” are contributing “to billions of dollars in cost overruns and delays in the system’s construction.”<sup>16</sup>

The auditor blames the state for beginning construction prematurely in October 2013 despite known risks, not acquiring sufficient land, failing to determine how to relocate utility systems, and not obtaining agreements with external stakeholders.<sup>17</sup> “These unmitigated risks have contributed to \$600 million in costs overruns thus far for the three active Central Valley construction projects, with another \$1.6 billion in additional costs needed to complete the projects.”<sup>18</sup>

The Rail Authority “cited the terms of a 2010 federal grant—which originally required construction to be complete by 2017—as the primary factor in its decision to begin construction when it did.”<sup>19</sup> The State Auditor “determined that even with a grant deadline extension until December 2022, the Authority could miss the new deadline unless Central Valley construction progresses twice as fast as it has to date.”<sup>20</sup>

Construction began two years behind schedule due to political, legal, logistical, environmental, and financial problems.<sup>21</sup> These setbacks “have forced contractors to leave equipment idle, which is likely to result in multimillion-dollar claims of losses,” according to the *Los Angeles Times*.<sup>22</sup>

In his 2019 State of the State Address, the governor said he would both scale back the project and “push for more federal funding.”<sup>23</sup> The governor stated, “let’s be real. The project, as currently planned, would cost too

much and take too long. There's been too little oversight and not enough transparency. Right now, there simply isn't a path to get from Sacramento to San Diego, let alone from San Francisco to LA. I wish there were."<sup>24</sup>

The U.S. Department of Transportation has since announced plans to cancel the \$929 million grant because the state has violated terms of the agreement—including falling \$100 million short in the state funding contribution—and is unlikely to complete project by 2022.<sup>25</sup> The federal government may also try to recover the \$2.6 billion grant.<sup>26</sup>

**Additional Comments:** The rail line is the “largest public-works” project underway in the U.S.<sup>27</sup> “It is expected to be one of the most expensive transportation projects undertaken in the United States,” according to GAO.<sup>28</sup>

When told of the increased cost and delays to finish the train, only one-third of Californians supported continuing construction while nearly half wanted it stopped, according to a 2018 USC Dornsife/*Los Angeles Times* poll.<sup>29</sup>



A financial train wreck: The California bullet train is more than a decade behind schedule and \$44 billion over budget.

## **Subway Tunnel Keeps Digging A Deeper Hole**

**Project:** The East Side Access project to connect New York City's subway between Long Island and Grand Central Station is nine years behind schedule and almost \$5 billion over budget.

**Location:** New York City, New York

**Recipient:** New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA)

**Original Cost Estimate:** \$4.3 billion in 1999 and revised upward to \$6.3 billion in 2006 when the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) authorized a Full Funding Grant Agreement<sup>30</sup>

**Current Cost Estimate:** \$11.1 billion<sup>31</sup>

**Project Began:** 2007<sup>32</sup>

**Original Completion Date:** 2009 in 1999 and revised to December 2013 in 2006<sup>33</sup>

**Current Completion Date:** December 2022<sup>34</sup>

**Funding Source:** U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration

**Federal Spending:** \$2.7 billion<sup>35</sup>

**Problems:** The East Side Access, which will add more than 8 miles of tunnels, an 8-track terminal and concourse, and 25,000 square feet of retail space,<sup>36</sup> has been dubbed “the most expensive mile of subway tuck on Earth,” by *The New York Times* (NYT).<sup>37</sup> The rail line is costing “nearly \$3.5 billion for each new mile of track — seven times the average elsewhere in the world.”<sup>38</sup> One tunnel is costing \$1 million per foot, according to one of the project's chief engineers.<sup>39</sup>

A “discrepancy” discovered by an accountant revealed that 200 employees who apparently had no actual job were being paid \$1,000 every day.<sup>40</sup> “Nobody knew what those people were doing, if they were doing anything,” admits the MTA's head of construction at the time.<sup>41</sup> The unneeded employees were laid off, but it could not be determined how long they had been on the payroll.<sup>42</sup>

The city's transit authority is paying “the highest construction costs in the world” while cutting back “on core subway maintenance.”<sup>43</sup>

MTA “almost never punishes vendors for spending too much or taking too long and local officials, “mired in bureaucracy, have not acted to curb the costs,” according to a *NYT* analysis.<sup>44</sup>

The owner of the Robbins Company, which manufactures equipment used for East Side Access, says “they could do twice as many expansion projects and still have more money for maintenance” if the authority was more cost efficient.<sup>45</sup>

Most of the project's cost overruns “occurred after the MTA entered into a full-funding agreement with the federal government in 2006,” according to the New York State Comptroller.<sup>46</sup>

Members of New York's congressional delegation have been seeking additional federal assistance for the East Side Access project.<sup>47</sup>

**Additional Comments:** The Department of Transportation called the amount being sunk in the East Side Access “the largest-ever federal investment in a single transit project” in 2006.<sup>48</sup> Today, the “megaproject” remains “one of the largest transportation infrastructure projects currently underway in the United States,” according to the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority.<sup>49</sup>

When announcing the award in 2006, the U.S. Secretary of Transportation stated, “for a city that gives meaning to the phrase time is money, hundreds of thousands of commuters shouldn’t have to waste both.”<sup>50</sup> With the project now nine years behind schedule and almost \$5 billion over budget, the city is wasting time and money.



Digging a deeper hole: Construction of new tunnels to extend New York City’s subway system is now nine years behind schedule and almost \$5 billion over budget.

## **Census Bureau Can't Count**

**Project:** The 2020 national population count conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau is more than \$3 billion over budget and will be the most expensive in U.S. history and government auditors are warning that the current cost estimate is not a reliable.

**Location:** Nationwide

**Recipient:** Census Bureau

**Original Cost Estimate:** \$12.3 billion in 2015<sup>51</sup>

**Current Cost Estimate:** \$15.6 billion<sup>52</sup>

**Project Began:** 2012<sup>53</sup>

**Original Completion Date:** September 2023<sup>54</sup>

**Current Completion Date:** September 2023<sup>55</sup>

**Funding Source:** U.S. Department of Commerce Census Bureau

**Federal Spending:** \$15.6 billion

**Problems:** While it is the job of the Census to count, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) says the Bureau's cost estimates do not add up.

The cost estimate to perform the 2020 census grew by 27 percent in just two years and the current estimate "cannot be considered reliable," according to a GAO review.<sup>56</sup>

"The 2020 Census does not fully reflect all the characteristics of a reliable estimate," according to GAO," because "some of the source data either did not support the information described in the cost estimate or was not in the files provided for two of its largest field operations."<sup>57</sup>

"The cost of the census, in terms of cost for counting each housing unit, has been escalating over the last several decennials," GAO reports.<sup>58</sup>

The 2010 Census had been the most expensive in history, costing about \$12.3 billion and 31 percent more than the 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars).<sup>59</sup> "The average cost for counting a housing unit increased from about \$16 in 1970 to around \$92 in 2010 (in 2020 constant dollars)."<sup>60</sup>


**Additional Comments:** The 2020 Census will be the most expensive census in our nation's history, costing \$15.6 billion, according to U.S. Census Bureau's own estimates.<sup>61</sup>

To encourage participation in the 2010 census, the Bureau spent \$1 billion on advertising and promotion, including \$42 million on Census swag and freebies like rubber footballs, toy robots, bags, hats, T-shirts and tape measures.<sup>62</sup>

The Census Bureau has budgeted \$415 million to "plan, design, produce, implement, and monitor an integrated communications program for the 2020 Census."<sup>63</sup>

# The 2020 Census

## Estimated Lifecycle Costs



Fewer Staff  
Fewer Offices  
Less Burden

**MORE THAN  
\$5 BILLION  
IN SAVINGS**

The 2020 population count will be the most expensive in history and auditors are warning that the agency's numbers still do not add up.<sup>64</sup>

## Waste Clean Up Is A Total Mess

**Project:** The cleanup of radioactive waste at a site in Washington state where plutonium was produced during the Cold War began decades ago, but has not treated any waste as of yet. As a result, the project is 25 years behind schedule and may end up costing \$100 billion more than originally estimated.

**Location:** Washington state

**Recipient:** Department of Energy and contractors

**Original Cost Estimate:** \$4.3 billion to complete the waste treatment plant (2000 estimate)<sup>65</sup> and \$47- \$50 billion to complete the cleanup<sup>66</sup>

**Current Cost Estimate:** The waste treatment plant is now expected to cost \$16.8 billion,<sup>67</sup> and the amount to complete the entire project is more than \$141 billion<sup>68</sup>

**Project Began:** 1989<sup>69</sup> (The project has been repeatedly canceled and restarted<sup>70</sup>)

**Original Completion Date:** The plant was required to begin operating in 2011 with the tank waste treatment to be completed by 2028<sup>71</sup>

**Current Completion Date:** Operation of the plant has been delayed until the end of 2036<sup>72</sup> with most of the cleanup finished by 2060 and the entire project completed before the end of 2090<sup>73</sup>

**Funding Source:** Department of Energy

**Federal Spending:** More than \$19 billion has already been spent as of 2015<sup>74</sup> and the project is costing \$2.5 billion a year, but the agency says more than \$4 billion is needed per year for the duration of the mission to meet the “scheduled milestones.”<sup>75</sup>

**Problems:** The management of Hanford is a mess and needs to be cleaned up as much as the hazardous materials at the site.

DOE has already spent more than \$19 billion on the Hanford cleanup project since it began 30 years ago, but has not even begun to treat the nuclear waste at the site.<sup>76</sup>

There are 177 tanks containing 55 million gallons of radioactive waste at Hanford. Just three gallons have been treated to date, as part of a technology “demonstration” test in December 2017.<sup>77</sup>

The cleanup “could take 20 to 30 years longer than projected,” according to the Hanford Advisory Board.<sup>78</sup>

The design of the facility intended to treat the waste is being made up as it is being constructed, the remedy chosen to immobilize the waste is twice as costly as an alternative method, no waste has been treated as of yet despite spending tens of billions of dollars over the past three decades, and millions of dollars have been lost to fraud and abuse, including paying employees for hours not worked, overcompensating contractors in exchange for kickbacks, awarding a bonus to a contractor for an ineffective product, billing the government for personal appliances, and spending federal funds to lobby Congress for more federal funds.

Numerous independent reviews blame poor management for the delays and cost overruns. GAO estimates the cost increased by nearly \$130 billion from fiscal year 2014 to 2018, “in part because of contract and project management problems.”<sup>79</sup> The DOE Office of Inspector General (OIG) says, “the Hanford Site has been

plagued with mismanagement, poor internal controls, and fraudulent activities, resulting in monetary impacts totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.”<sup>80</sup>

The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) “is being constructed under a design-build contract,” in which plant design, construction, and technology development “occur simultaneously rather than sequentially.” This arrangement has led to cost and schedule overruns,” yet DOE continues to use it for the WTP, according to GAO.<sup>81</sup>

Nearly \$20 billion could be saved by simply using a different remedy for the waste buried at Hanford.<sup>82</sup> Closing the tanks and filling them with a cement-like material, which is how DOE is handling radioactive waste elsewhere, would have cost \$19 billion while the approach that will be employed at Hanford in which tanks will be dug up and encased in glass is expected to cost \$37 billion.<sup>83</sup>

A contractor that produced large tanks intended to contain radioactive waste, known as vessels, was paid a \$30 million bonus, or incentive fee, despite failing to meet quality assurance requirements.<sup>84</sup> While DOE requested a refund of a \$15 million bonus paid for a vessel that was defective, the money was never repaid.<sup>85</sup> The importance of these “components cannot be overstated,” warned the DOE OIG.<sup>86</sup> “Premature failure of these components could potentially impact safety, contaminate large portions of a multi-billion-dollar facility, and interrupt waste processing for an unknown period of time.”<sup>87</sup>

Federal funds were illegally spent “to pay for a comprehensive, multi-year lobbying campaign of Congress and other federal officials for continued funding at the WTP.”<sup>88</sup>

For nearly a decade, some employees were being paid for hours that they did not work.<sup>89</sup>

An illegal kickback scheme gave favorable treatment and inflated payments to a contractor.<sup>90</sup>

As part of one scheme, the government was charged and paid more than twice the value of what goods purchased were worth.<sup>91</sup>

The federal government was charged for televisions and home appliances for personal use.<sup>92</sup> One employee made purchases from his family’s company, but did not deliver the items.<sup>93</sup>

In addition to the rising costs, the environmental and health risks continue to increase with the delays. The aging underground storage tanks of hazardous radioactive waste—some of which have already leaked—continue to deteriorate and threaten the groundwater and the nearby Columbia River.<sup>94</sup>

Some whistleblowers who worked at the site claim they suffered retaliation for raising safety concerns.<sup>95 96 97</sup>

### **Additional Comments:**

DOE’s cost estimate to cleanup nuclear waste in the U.S. increased \$110.2 billion in a single year, primarily due to the costs of the Hanford site.<sup>98</sup> The amount jumped from \$383.78 billion in Fiscal Year 2017 to \$493.96 billion in FY ‘18.<sup>99</sup> Eighty percent of the increase is attributed to Hanford.<sup>100</sup>

DOE’s estimates for completion “are not reliable because they do not meet industry best practices,” according to GAO.<sup>101</sup> “Without reliable estimates that reflect best practices, DOE may be committing to courses of action that will require undisclosed future resources and will commit DOE to project time frames it may be unable to meet,” GAO concludes.<sup>102</sup>

“The removal and stabilization of these wastes at Hanford by mixing them with molten glass, at an estimated cost of as much as \$72.3 billion, represents the single largest, most expensive, and potentially riskiest nuclear

cleanup project ever undertaken by the United States,” explains a former DOE senior policy advisor.<sup>103</sup> “It’s roughly comparable to the Apollo moon program in cost and risk, except there’s no moon.”<sup>104</sup>



The management of the waste cleanup at Hanford is a total mess.



A contractor delivered a container to hold radioactive waste that was later found to be defective and a potential threat to health and safety, but was still awarded with a \$15 million bonus.

## **Grounded Moon Rocket Costs Soar**

**Project:** The rocket intended to return astronauts to the moon has been grounded by repeated delays while its costs are soaring billions of dollars over budget due to the “poor performance” of a contractor that continues to be paid big bonuses by NASA.

**Location:** Managed out of Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama with work in 43 states

**Recipient:** Boeing is the main contractor with more than 1,100 contractors

**Original Cost Estimate:** \$6.2 billion in 2012<sup>105</sup>

**Current Cost Estimate:** At least \$8.9 billion projected in 2018<sup>106</sup>

**Project Began:** 2012

**Original Completion Date:** June 2017 for delivery of the first stage; The first unmanned mission was planned for December 2017 with the first crewed mission was projected to launch in mid-2021<sup>107</sup>

**Current Completion Date:** December 2019 for delivery of the first stage; The first unmanned mission has been rescheduled for mid-2020 and the first crewed mission is now planned for mid-2022<sup>108</sup>

**Funding Source:** National Aeronautics and Space Administration

**Federal Spending:** \$5.3 billion as of August 2018<sup>109</sup>

### **Problems:**

NASA will spend at least \$8.9 billion on the fuel tanks and supporting infrastructure for the Space Launch System (SLS) of the next manned space vehicle by the end of 2021—double the amount planned—while delivery of the rockets has slipped more than two years from June 2017 to December 2019.<sup>110</sup>

Billions of dollars more will be necessary to get the project off of the ground. An additional \$1.2 billion is needed to complete and deliver the fuel tanks by 2019 and meet the June 2020 launch date, according to calculations by the NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG).<sup>111</sup> This amount does not include “the billions more required to complete work” on other components of the system.<sup>112</sup>

The cost increases and schedule delays “can be traced largely to management, technical, and infrastructure issues driven by Boeing’s poor performance,” according to the OIG, as well as “poor contract management practices” by NASA.<sup>113</sup>

“Flaws in NASA’s evaluation of Boeing’s performance” are “inflating the contractor’s scores and leading to overly generous award fees.”<sup>114</sup> As a result, NASA deemed Boeing’s performance “excellent” in three evaluations and “very good” in three others and paid \$323 million in bonus awards despite the cost overages and schedule delays.<sup>115</sup>

As designed, the contract makes it difficult for the agency to track expenditures which is affecting determination of pricing for future work on the project.<sup>116</sup>

NASA exceeded its legal spending authority and approved \$321.7 million that was never authorized.<sup>117</sup>

Because the launch system has not yet undergone the testing stage, the OIG warns, “Boeing’s cost and schedule challenges are likely to worsen.”<sup>118</sup>

As of August 2018, \$5.3 billion out of \$6.2 billion allocated for the Boeing contract had already been expended and NASA expects Boeing to have exhausted the full funding amount in early 2019, three years before the contract is supposed to end.<sup>119</sup> As a result, the program “will require a major increase in funding,” according to the OIG, which projects “at least \$8.9 billion” will be needed—double the amount initially planned.<sup>120</sup>

Delivery of the first stage of the rocket has “slipped 2 ½ years from June 2017 to December 2019 and may slip further,” the OIG warns.<sup>121</sup>

The delays are also “jeopardizing planned launch dates” for other NASA missions that will use the rocket, including a mission to one of Jupiter’s moons in 2022.<sup>122</sup>

NASA has not released the per-flight cost estimates of the SLS rocket, but some estimates “peg it at \$1.5 to \$2.5 billion per launch. The cost is so high that it effectively precludes more than one to two SLS launches per year.”<sup>123</sup>

### **Additional Comments:**

The SLS is a leftover of the Constellation project that was canceled by President Barack Obama<sup>124</sup> after an independent commission found cost increases and schedule delays made it “unsustainable.”<sup>125</sup> Despite its own delays and cost overruns, Congress has stood by the SLS, causing critics to deride it as the “Senate Launch System,” that “serves more as a jobs program in key congressional districts.”<sup>126</sup>



NASA’s manned space rocket will not be getting off the ground any time soon but its costs are soaring skyward.

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- <sup>1</sup> “VA CONSTRUCTION: Additional Actions Needed to Decrease Delays and Lower Costs of Major Medical-Facility Projects,” Government Accountability Office, April 2013; <https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653585.pdf> .
- <sup>2</sup> Congressman Mike Coffman, “How the \$1.7 billion VA boondoggle got unbungled,” The Denver Post, July 20, 2018; <https://www.denverpost.com/2018/07/20/how-the-1-7-billion-va-boondoggle-got-unbungled/>.
- <sup>3</sup> “California High-Speed Rail Authority: Its Flawed Decision Making and Poor Contract Management Have Contributed to Billions in Cost Overruns and Delays in the System’s Construction,” public letter for report number 2018-108, California State Auditor, November 15, 2018; <https://www.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2018-108/index.html>.
- <sup>4</sup> “HIGH-RISK SERIES Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others,” Government Accountability Office, February 2017; <https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682765.pdf>.
- <sup>5</sup> Ralph Vartabedian, “State audit blames bullet train mismanagement for delays and price hikes,” Los Angeles Times, November 15, 2018; <https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-bullet-train-audit-20181115-story.html>.
- <sup>6</sup> “Report to the Legislature,” California High-Speed Rail Authority, December 2009; [http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business\\_plans/BPlan\\_2009\\_Legis\\_FullRpt.pdf](http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business_plans/BPlan_2009_Legis_FullRpt.pdf).
- <sup>7</sup> “2018 Business Plan,” California High-Speed Rail Authority, June 1, 2018; [http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business\\_plans/2018\\_BusinessPlan.pdf](http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business_plans/2018_BusinessPlan.pdf) .
- <sup>8</sup> “California High-Speed Rail Authority: Its Flawed Decision Making and Poor Contract Management Have Contributed to Billions in Cost Overruns and Delays in the System’s Construction,” report number 2018-108, California State Auditor, November 15, 2018; <https://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2018-108.pdf>.
- <sup>9</sup> “Report to the Legislature,” California High-Speed Rail Authority, December 2009; [http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business\\_plans/BPlan\\_2009\\_Legis\\_FullRpt.pdf](http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business_plans/BPlan_2009_Legis_FullRpt.pdf).
- <sup>10</sup> “California High-Speed Rail Authority: Its Flawed Decision Making and Poor Contract Management Have Contributed to Billions in Cost Overruns and Delays in the System’s Construction,” report number 2018-108, California State Auditor, November 15, 2018; <https://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2018-108.pdf>.
- <sup>11</sup> “California High-Speed Rail Authority: Its Flawed Decision Making and Poor Contract Management Have Contributed to Billions in Cost Overruns and Delays in the System’s Construction,” introduction to report number 2018-108, California State Auditor, November 15, 2018; <https://www.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2018-108/introduction.html>.
- <sup>12</sup> “California High Speed Rail; Project Estimates Could Be Improved to Better Inform Future Decisions,” Government Accountability Office, March 2013; <https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653401.pdf>.
- <sup>13</sup> “California High-Speed Rail Authority: Its Flawed Decision Making and Poor Contract Management Have Contributed to Billions in Cost Overruns and Delays in the System’s Construction,” public letter for report number 2018-108, California State Auditor, November 15, 2018; <https://www.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2018-108/index.html>.
- <sup>14</sup> “California High Speed Rail; Project Estimates Could Be Improved to Better Inform Future Decisions,” Government Accountability Office, March 2013; <https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653401.pdf>.
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<sup>83</sup> The two main remedies that were considered were (1) to close the tanks in place by filling them with a cement-like material—called grout—and covering them with soil or (2) to exhume, dismantle, and prepare the tanks for disposal after removing all of the radioactive waste. According to a 2014 DOE analysis, closing Hanford’s 149 single-shell tanks—those tanks with a single container—in place would cost \$19 billion, or \$18 billion less than the costs of removing the waste and preparing the 149 tanks for disposal (\$19 billion versus \$37 billion, respectively). “DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: Program-Wide Strategy and Better Reporting Needed to Address Growing Environmental Cleanup Liability,” Government Accountability Office, January 2019; <https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/696632.pdf> .

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
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## MANAGEMENT’S ANALYSIS, ASSURANCES AND PRIORITIES



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## CONSOLIDATED AND COMBINED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

### Principal Statements

#### U.S. Department of Energy Consolidated Balance Sheets

As of September 30, 2018 and 2017

(\$ IN MILLIONS)	FY 2018	FY 2017
Environmental Cleanup and Disposal Liabilities <small>(Note 15)</small>	493,960	383,784

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